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The Clock Keeps Ticking… 
By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies 
The latest news indicates that negotiations between the UK and EU 
are still at an impasse, with the “endgame” of talks dragging on for 
weeks. The ultimate sticking point appears to be over the border 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic. As an opening gambit, 
the EU’s initial proposal was that Northern Ireland should remain in 
the European Economic Area and EU Customs Union (or have a 
customs union with the EU) whilst Great Britain (at the behest of the 
UK Government) was to leave both. Contrary to some reports at the 
time, it was always made clear that this was merely an opening 
suggestion and that alternatives or amendments from the UK side 
would be welcomed. 
Unsurprisingly, this proposal was never going to be acceptable to the 
UK Government (and very probably to many people in Northern 
Ireland). Implementing a “border” for goods between Northern Ireland 
and Great Britain was always going to be too contentious for the UK 
Government to stomach and the Unionist community in Northern 
Ireland reacted with predictable hostility to the idea. 
Similarly, the idea of a hard border with physical infrastructure 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic was equally abhorrent to 
the Nationalist community (not to mention the fact that it would be 
damaging for the all-island economy). Continuing talks have thus 
been to find some sort of compromise. The latest proposal is for the 
entire UK to remain in a customs union with the EU and for Northern 
Ireland to remain aligned to crucial Single Market rules, particularly 
around sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. 
There are two challenges for the UK Government now. Firstly, it 
makes explicit that Northern Ireland will have different regulatory 
standards to Great Britain. Secondly, there are a number of 
challenges and complications around the idea of a customs union. It is 
from these that all objections (whether domestic or from the EU 
negotiating team) stem. 
If Northern Ireland is to remain within the EU’s regulatory system then 
two things will need to happen: 
1. Physical checks on goods (especially agricultural goods) 
between the UK and Northern Ireland will need to take place. 
2. A mechanism will be needed to ensure that Northern Ireland 
stays aligned to EU rules and that these are appropriately 
enforced. 
The first would appear to be a deal-breaker for Theresa May’s DUP 
coalition partners. However, it is not as simple as it might seem. 
Firstly, some (primarily agricultural) checks already take place. 
Secondly, there already exists scope for the devolved government in 
Northern Ireland to adopt regulations different from those in the rest of 
the UK. Moreover, there need be no checks on goods flowing from 
Northern Ireland to Great Britain as these would be entirely under the 
purview of the UK Government (who would surely wish to minimise 
any friction in intra-UK trade). 
The latter issue, however, is more problematic. What happens when 
the EU passes new regulations and directives? Presumably, 
regulations will be put into immediate effect as in the rest of the EU 
(although it remains to be seen how the UK might choose to deal with 
the potential for divergence in this area). Directives are more 
problematic as they need to be passed into law by EU (or EEA) 
countries themselves. Stormont must therefore be given sufficient 
competencies to do this (or the UK Government must undertake to do 
so). Of course, the Stormont government has been suspended for a 
significant proportion of its total existence – and is indeed suspended 
at present. This is an issue, albeit a surmountable one. 
As for enforcement, the sole arbiter of EU law at present is the Court 
of Justice of the EU. Presumably the UK would need to agree that the 
Court of Justice had jurisdiction over Northern Ireland but not Great 
Britain. This might prove a challenging sell to both the DUP and those 
with Unionist sympathies on the Conservative backbenches. 
The second, key, sticking point is the nature of any proposed customs 
union. A substantial minority of Conservative backbenchers want any 
customs union to be temporary. For many, the ability to sign trade 
deals independent of the EU is a key reason for leaving the 
organisation. Moreover, the UK may well find itself in the same 
position that Turkey is in: having to grant privileged reduced tariffs to 
third parties when they do not reciprocate. 
However, if a customs union is temporary, can this function as an 
effective backstop? After all, it is possible that no agreement can be 
found on how to avoid a border on the island of Ireland on a 
permanent basis before the expiry of the customs union. As such, it is 
unsurprising that the EU has objected to a time-limited backstop 
strenuously. Current discussions centre around what ‘triggers’ could 
enable the UK to leave the customs union (i.e. how to make it 
temporary but not time-limited), but this is more difficult than many 
had envisaged. By the same token, Labour has stated that they will 
vote down any proposal that does not contain a permanent customs 
union. 
We have therefore reached an impasse. The two negotiating teams 
have still not agreed on a proposal to avoid a hard border on the 
island of Ireland and time is running out. In the event that a 
Withdrawal Agreement is agreed (and it will now, by necessity, be 
relatively last-minute), it must be ratified. Presumably this will occur 
relatively smoothly on the EU side. However, it is not unlikely that any 
deal acceptable to the EU and UK negotiating teams will fail to satisfy 
the House of Commons. The UK therefore faces a real dilemma and it 
is not at all clear how (or even whether) the Gordian knot can be cut. 
 
